By Gözde Kök*
As the Justice and Development Party (AKP) completes its 24th year in power this month, the debate over the nature of Turkey’s political regime remains very much alive. The arrests of opposition politicians and journalists, the use of the judiciary as an instrument of political intervention, restrictions on the freedoms of assembly and organisation, the removal of elected mayors from office, and, more recently, the operations targeting the main opposition party have all reinforced the widely held view among left-wing opposition circles that the AKP has established a fascist regime.
The expression “one-man regime”, often used to convey much the same idea, describes a system of government centred on the President, in which all state institutions are subordinated to his will.
Although these descriptions may appear to capture the repressive character of the government, they fall short of explaining Turkey’s political situation. More importantly, they narrow the objectives of political struggle. When the central goal becomes defeating fascism, ending one-man rule or removing Erdoğan from power, the class relations behind the repression are pushed out of sight. This, in turn, gives rise to calls for the broadest possible opposition alliance. The left is thus presented with the prospect of an alliance that brings together, on one side, the social-democratic main opposition, which remains firmly in the wake of big capital, and, on the other, the Kurdish nationalist movement, which leads a coalition that also includes reactionary Kurdish tribal leaders and is pressing Turkey together with the forces in power for a new “peace process” based on ethnic and religious divisions and neo-Ottoman expansionist ambitions.
Yet there is no need to invoke fascism to explain the AKP’s repressive policies. On the contrary, the indiscriminate use of the term makes it harder to understand the government’s actual strength, its limitations and the reasons behind its growing reliance on repression.
Fascism by definition and in its historical trajectory
Georgi Dimitrov’s report to the Seventh Congress of the Communist International in 1935 occupies an important place in the communist movement’s historical understanding of fascism. Dimitrov defined fascism in power as the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinist and most imperialist elements of finance capital. This definition approached fascism through the particular political form assumed by capitalist class rule under certain conditions, rather than through the personal characteristics of political leaders or the intensity of state violence.
The rise of fascism in Germany and Italy was closely connected to the profound crises of capitalism following the First World War and the existence of a powerful working-class movement. In Germany in particular, the communist movement posed a serious political threat to the bourgeois system. Under these circumstances, fascism emerged as a political regime through which the capitalist system could be maintained, imperialist ambitions pursued and, to these ends, the working-class movement crushed.
Throughout the twentieth century, state apparatuses under fascist regimes were reorganised in line with the needs of monopoly capital and imperialist expansion. Fascism also established ideological and political mechanisms capable of binding society to a particular historical project. Fascist governments possessed a considerable capacity to mobilise and rally broad masses behind them. The Nazis drew on Germany’s defeat in the First World War, economic devastation and widespread social discontent to construct a narrative promising the rebirth of the German nation. Rooted in chauvinist nationalism, anti-communism and racism, this ideology mobilised different sections of society around a common political objective. Mass support played an important part in the establishment of fascist rule and the subsequent reorganisation of society.
The defining characteristics of fascism cannot be reduced to the severity of state repression. Capitalist states restrict democratic rights and suppress working-class movements by force under political regimes other than fascism. The murder of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht in 1919, during the founding period of the Weimar Republic rather than under a fascist regime, is a striking example. To identify a regime as fascist, we must explain why the capitalist class has become unable to maintain its rule through existing political arrangements, how the state has been reorganised, and what social and ideological conditions have made such a transformation both necessary and possible.
The character of the AKP rule
The AKP’s nearly quarter-century in power offers numerous examples that invite comparisons with the fascist regimes of the twentieth century. It came to power with strong backing from the capitalist class, fostered the growth of business groups close to the government, sought to bring trade unions and social organisations under its control, placed loyal cadres in state institutions, and made the judiciary and the media increasingly dependent on political power.
The 2017 constitutional amendment took this centralisation further by concentrating executive authority in the Presidency, reducing parliament’s capacity to exercise oversight and expanding political interference in the judiciary. The repression directed against opposition politicians, journalists and social movements in recent years, the appointment of government trustees to replace elected local authorities, and the operations targeting municipalities governed by the main opposition party are all part of this picture.
These developments leave little doubt about the AKP’s reactionary and repressive character. But similarities with fascist regimes do not explain why the capitalist class in Turkey would need fascism. To answer that question, we must examine the present conditions of capitalist class rule and the AKP’s place within the system.
Fascism is the most reactionary form of political regime available to the capitalist class. The bourgeoisie does not turn to fascism because it suddenly abandons its commitment to democratic freedoms. It has never hesitated to restrict those freedoms when they threaten the capitalist system as a whole. Fascism comes onto the agenda when existing political mechanisms prove inadequate to safeguard that rule and the course of class struggle makes a different form of government necessary.
No such necessity exists in Turkey today. For the time being, the working class lacks the organisation and political strength to pose a vital threat to the capitalist system. Economic problems and social discontent are growing, but they have yet to develop into an organised political struggle directed against capitalism. Moreover, the bourgeoisie can maintain its pressure on labour without resorting to a fascist regime. Working-class organisation has been substantially weakened, public assets have been transferred to capital, and privatisation and marketisation have greatly expanded the scope for capital accumulation. The existing regime, with all its repressive features, continues to serve the fundamental interests of the capitalist class. There is no compelling reason for the bourgeoisie to seek a fascist reorganisation of political power.
The AKP’s efforts to concentrate executive power, monopolise political authority and use the state’s coercive apparatus against the opposition should also be considered in a wider international context. Similar tendencies are increasingly visible even in Western capitalist countries that pride themselves on their democratic traditions.
The AKP’s particular role in this process deserves closer attention. It has been the principal political force behind a transformation that deepened the integration of Turkish capitalism into the imperialist system, dismantled gains won by working people and placed the resources of the state more extensively than ever at the disposal of capital. Today, the AKP continues to pursue policies aimed at convincing the monopolies that it can represent their interests more effectively and more ruthlessly than any of its rivals. At the same time, it seeks to eliminate those very rivals, leaving the capitalist class with no political alternative to its own rule.
Yet none of this is sufficient for the AKP to establish a fascist regime on its own. Quite apart from the absence of the historical conditions for such a regime, it is highly doubtful that the AKP possesses the political capacity to build one.
Establishing a fascist regime requires more than control over the state’s coercive apparatus. It entails a comprehensive reorganisation of political and social life, the elimination or transformation of existing institutions, and the mobilisation of a social force capable of carrying this process forward. The AKP was once a political movement capable of mobilising broad sections of society, offering them a vision of the future and transforming the structure of the state accordingly. After nearly a quarter-century in power, however, that capacity has been seriously eroded. The social and institutional strength of religious reaction, the state resources at the government’s disposal and the electoral support it still commands should not be underestimated. But none of these guarantees that the AKP can mobilise society behind its political project as it once did.
Although these descriptions may appear to capture the repressive character of the government, they fall short of explaining Turkey’s political situation. More importantly, they narrow the objectives of political struggle. When the central goal becomes defeating fascism, ending one-man rule or removing Erdoğan from power, the class relations behind the repression are pushed out of sight. This, in turn, gives rise to calls for the broadest possible opposition alliance. The left is thus presented with the prospect of an alliance that brings together, on one side, the social-democratic main opposition, which remains firmly in the wake of big capital, and, on the other, the Kurdish nationalist movement, which leads a coalition that also includes reactionary Kurdish tribal leaders and is pressing Turkey together with the forces in power for a new “peace process” based on ethnic and religious divisions and neo-Ottoman expansionist ambitions.
Yet there is no need to invoke fascism to explain the AKP’s repressive policies. On the contrary, the indiscriminate use of the term makes it harder to understand the government’s actual strength, its limitations and the reasons behind its growing reliance on repression.
Fascism by definition and in its historical trajectory
Georgi Dimitrov’s report to the Seventh Congress of the Communist International in 1935 occupies an important place in the communist movement’s historical understanding of fascism. Dimitrov defined fascism in power as the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinist and most imperialist elements of finance capital. This definition approached fascism through the particular political form assumed by capitalist class rule under certain conditions, rather than through the personal characteristics of political leaders or the intensity of state violence.
The rise of fascism in Germany and Italy was closely connected to the profound crises of capitalism following the First World War and the existence of a powerful working-class movement. In Germany in particular, the communist movement posed a serious political threat to the bourgeois system. Under these circumstances, fascism emerged as a political regime through which the capitalist system could be maintained, imperialist ambitions pursued and, to these ends, the working-class movement crushed.
Throughout the twentieth century, state apparatuses under fascist regimes were reorganised in line with the needs of monopoly capital and imperialist expansion. Fascism also established ideological and political mechanisms capable of binding society to a particular historical project. Fascist governments possessed a considerable capacity to mobilise and rally broad masses behind them. The Nazis drew on Germany’s defeat in the First World War, economic devastation and widespread social discontent to construct a narrative promising the rebirth of the German nation. Rooted in chauvinist nationalism, anti-communism and racism, this ideology mobilised different sections of society around a common political objective. Mass support played an important part in the establishment of fascist rule and the subsequent reorganisation of society.
The defining characteristics of fascism cannot be reduced to the severity of state repression. Capitalist states restrict democratic rights and suppress working-class movements by force under political regimes other than fascism. The murder of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht in 1919, during the founding period of the Weimar Republic rather than under a fascist regime, is a striking example. To identify a regime as fascist, we must explain why the capitalist class has become unable to maintain its rule through existing political arrangements, how the state has been reorganised, and what social and ideological conditions have made such a transformation both necessary and possible.
The character of the AKP rule
The AKP’s nearly quarter-century in power offers numerous examples that invite comparisons with the fascist regimes of the twentieth century. It came to power with strong backing from the capitalist class, fostered the growth of business groups close to the government, sought to bring trade unions and social organisations under its control, placed loyal cadres in state institutions, and made the judiciary and the media increasingly dependent on political power.
The 2017 constitutional amendment took this centralisation further by concentrating executive authority in the Presidency, reducing parliament’s capacity to exercise oversight and expanding political interference in the judiciary. The repression directed against opposition politicians, journalists and social movements in recent years, the appointment of government trustees to replace elected local authorities, and the operations targeting municipalities governed by the main opposition party are all part of this picture.
These developments leave little doubt about the AKP’s reactionary and repressive character. But similarities with fascist regimes do not explain why the capitalist class in Turkey would need fascism. To answer that question, we must examine the present conditions of capitalist class rule and the AKP’s place within the system.
Fascism is the most reactionary form of political regime available to the capitalist class. The bourgeoisie does not turn to fascism because it suddenly abandons its commitment to democratic freedoms. It has never hesitated to restrict those freedoms when they threaten the capitalist system as a whole. Fascism comes onto the agenda when existing political mechanisms prove inadequate to safeguard that rule and the course of class struggle makes a different form of government necessary.
No such necessity exists in Turkey today. For the time being, the working class lacks the organisation and political strength to pose a vital threat to the capitalist system. Economic problems and social discontent are growing, but they have yet to develop into an organised political struggle directed against capitalism. Moreover, the bourgeoisie can maintain its pressure on labour without resorting to a fascist regime. Working-class organisation has been substantially weakened, public assets have been transferred to capital, and privatisation and marketisation have greatly expanded the scope for capital accumulation. The existing regime, with all its repressive features, continues to serve the fundamental interests of the capitalist class. There is no compelling reason for the bourgeoisie to seek a fascist reorganisation of political power.
The AKP’s efforts to concentrate executive power, monopolise political authority and use the state’s coercive apparatus against the opposition should also be considered in a wider international context. Similar tendencies are increasingly visible even in Western capitalist countries that pride themselves on their democratic traditions.
The AKP’s particular role in this process deserves closer attention. It has been the principal political force behind a transformation that deepened the integration of Turkish capitalism into the imperialist system, dismantled gains won by working people and placed the resources of the state more extensively than ever at the disposal of capital. Today, the AKP continues to pursue policies aimed at convincing the monopolies that it can represent their interests more effectively and more ruthlessly than any of its rivals. At the same time, it seeks to eliminate those very rivals, leaving the capitalist class with no political alternative to its own rule.
Yet none of this is sufficient for the AKP to establish a fascist regime on its own. Quite apart from the absence of the historical conditions for such a regime, it is highly doubtful that the AKP possesses the political capacity to build one.
Establishing a fascist regime requires more than control over the state’s coercive apparatus. It entails a comprehensive reorganisation of political and social life, the elimination or transformation of existing institutions, and the mobilisation of a social force capable of carrying this process forward. The AKP was once a political movement capable of mobilising broad sections of society, offering them a vision of the future and transforming the structure of the state accordingly. After nearly a quarter-century in power, however, that capacity has been seriously eroded. The social and institutional strength of religious reaction, the state resources at the government’s disposal and the electoral support it still commands should not be underestimated. But none of these guarantees that the AKP can mobilise society behind its political project as it once did.
The AKP’s political ambitions and its growing reliance on repression
In its early years, the AKP had a programme aimed at transforming Turkey in line with the needs of capital. Promises of economic growth, the prospect of EU membership, the rhetoric of democratisation, the consolidation of religious reaction in social life and state institutions, and the restructuring of the state were all part of this programme. Backed by broad sections of the capitalist class, the AKP was able to mobilise considerable social support for this transformation.
Alongside its efforts to reorganise Turkish capitalism domestically, it has also pursued its own vision of Turkey’s place in the imperialist system, seeking to expand the economic and political reach of Turkish capital, particularly across the territories of the former Ottoman Empire. This neo-Ottomanist vision has offered the Turkish bourgeoisie the prospect of new markets, investments and spheres of influence within the framework of wider imperialist plans. It remains an important part of the AKP’s political project.
Yet this vision has failed to generate comparable enthusiasm in society. After nearly a quarter-century in power, the AKP is finding it increasingly difficult to convince even sections of its own support base that such ambitions offer a way out of the country’s deepening political crisis and widespread poverty. Its project has not disappeared, but its capacity to mobilise society around that project has seriously weakened. The government continues to pursue its ambitions while increasingly relying on repression to deal with the political and social tensions it cannot resolve.
Repressive interventions in political life do not eliminate contradictions. On the contrary, conflicts among different factions within the ruling bloc, driven by competing political and economic interests and including the struggle over who will succeed Erdogan, have intensified to the point where they can no longer be concealed. As these conflicts grow sharper, they further obstruct any attempt to act with a coherent strategy and a common political direction. Faced with political and social opposition, those in power increasingly resort to repression, often responding to immediate threats at the expense of a coherent political strategy.
The recent funding scandal has dealt another major blow to the AKP’s mechanisms for manufacturing consent. After 24 years in power, the party now faces a profound crisis of governance.
This does not mean that the AKP has lost all its strength or that it will soon be removed from power. No clearly defined political alternative has yet taken shape. Its control over the state apparatus and its position within the capitalist system also allow it to remain in power. But remaining in power and retaining the political capacity to govern a country are two different things.
What should communists do?
To argue that Turkey does not have a fascist regime is not to downplay the AKP’s repressive practices. Communists do not need to label these practices fascist in order to fight against them. The question is what political objective this fight should serve. Calls for the broadest possible democratic front against the AKP’s repression envisage acting side by side with the political forces that serve in the last instance for the continuation of the capitalist system around the goal of removing the present government. In such an alliance, confronting the capitalist system is pushed into the background, while the independent political objectives of the working class become subordinate to the priorities of the opposition operating within the system. For TKP, the defence of democratic rights cannot be separated from the struggle against bourgeois dictatorship.
Constantly presenting the government’s repression as proof of its strength also creates an image of an unassailable government. Yet while the AKP can silence political rivals, it cannot eliminate social discontent. It can restrict the opposition’s room for manoeuvre, but it has failed to generate renewed popular support or enthusiasm.
The task of communists is to expose the capitalist class rule behind the repression, explain why the government increasingly depends on coercion, and strengthen the independent political struggle of the working class. A political struggle that refuses to settle for replacing the AKP with another representative of the capitalist system can also provide a genuine social basis for resisting repression.
Alongside its efforts to reorganise Turkish capitalism domestically, it has also pursued its own vision of Turkey’s place in the imperialist system, seeking to expand the economic and political reach of Turkish capital, particularly across the territories of the former Ottoman Empire. This neo-Ottomanist vision has offered the Turkish bourgeoisie the prospect of new markets, investments and spheres of influence within the framework of wider imperialist plans. It remains an important part of the AKP’s political project.
Yet this vision has failed to generate comparable enthusiasm in society. After nearly a quarter-century in power, the AKP is finding it increasingly difficult to convince even sections of its own support base that such ambitions offer a way out of the country’s deepening political crisis and widespread poverty. Its project has not disappeared, but its capacity to mobilise society around that project has seriously weakened. The government continues to pursue its ambitions while increasingly relying on repression to deal with the political and social tensions it cannot resolve.
Repressive interventions in political life do not eliminate contradictions. On the contrary, conflicts among different factions within the ruling bloc, driven by competing political and economic interests and including the struggle over who will succeed Erdogan, have intensified to the point where they can no longer be concealed. As these conflicts grow sharper, they further obstruct any attempt to act with a coherent strategy and a common political direction. Faced with political and social opposition, those in power increasingly resort to repression, often responding to immediate threats at the expense of a coherent political strategy.
The recent funding scandal has dealt another major blow to the AKP’s mechanisms for manufacturing consent. After 24 years in power, the party now faces a profound crisis of governance.
This does not mean that the AKP has lost all its strength or that it will soon be removed from power. No clearly defined political alternative has yet taken shape. Its control over the state apparatus and its position within the capitalist system also allow it to remain in power. But remaining in power and retaining the political capacity to govern a country are two different things.
What should communists do?
To argue that Turkey does not have a fascist regime is not to downplay the AKP’s repressive practices. Communists do not need to label these practices fascist in order to fight against them. The question is what political objective this fight should serve. Calls for the broadest possible democratic front against the AKP’s repression envisage acting side by side with the political forces that serve in the last instance for the continuation of the capitalist system around the goal of removing the present government. In such an alliance, confronting the capitalist system is pushed into the background, while the independent political objectives of the working class become subordinate to the priorities of the opposition operating within the system. For TKP, the defence of democratic rights cannot be separated from the struggle against bourgeois dictatorship.
Constantly presenting the government’s repression as proof of its strength also creates an image of an unassailable government. Yet while the AKP can silence political rivals, it cannot eliminate social discontent. It can restrict the opposition’s room for manoeuvre, but it has failed to generate renewed popular support or enthusiasm.
The task of communists is to expose the capitalist class rule behind the repression, explain why the government increasingly depends on coercion, and strengthen the independent political struggle of the working class. A political struggle that refuses to settle for replacing the AKP with another representative of the capitalist system can also provide a genuine social basis for resisting repression.
* Gözde Kök is a member of TKP Party Council.
