Turkey is at a crossroads.
On one side of this crossroads lies a reality in which the interests of the working majority are sacrificed for the profits of a small group of monopolies; where extreme wealth and extreme poverty coexist; where absolute exploitation and inequality prevail; where the expansionist ambitions of capital disregard the borders and internal affairs of other countries; where there is full alignment with imperialism; and perhaps where the neo-Ottoman ambitions of Turkish capital could drive the country toward an existential abyss.
The Communist Party of Turkey recently issued an important statement emphasizing that this crossroads is not only historical but also immediate and urgent. We begin here because the issue is closely related to the Iran War. To understand this connection, we must take a closer look at the first path above. Within this path, there are propositions that belong to the same direction but differ slightly through secondary alternatives. While these differences become visible when examining Turkey’s position in the Iran War, it is also necessary to question how meaningful they actually are.
Since the beginning of the war, statements made by Turkish officials have contained certain contradictions—or at least differences in tone. This reflects internal conflicts of interest within the government, as well as an ongoing struggle over the post-Erdoğan period, something that has long been observed across many political issues in Turkey. Of course, when it comes to the deepening of exploitation, the drive for profit, plunder, and destruction, these differences amount to little more than nuance. In the case of the Iran War, despite differing justifications, all positions ultimately converge at the same point: a more pro-U.S., pro-NATO alignment and greater integration into imperialist plans.
A very brief overview of Turkey’s statements since the beginning of the Iran war: On the first day, relatively moderate statements were made, calling for peace and diplomacy. Within hours, however, these were followed by statements condemning Iran’s response and placing it on equal footing with U.S. attacks. Thus, a position emerged that increasingly placed greater responsibility for escalating tensions on Iran. As mentioned, due to the dual nature of these statements, Turkey’s stance has oscillated between assigning equal responsibility to the U.S. and Iran and shifting the weight more heavily toward Iran.
In incidents where three missiles were intercepted by NATO air defense systems on the grounds that they had entered Turkish airspace, Turkey adopted rhetoric that at times escalated tensions—even though Iran denied firing any missiles targeting Turkey. NATO, for its part, did not refrain from making provocative statements aimed at drawing Turkey further into the conflict; even before it was clear where the missiles had originated or where they were headed, Iran was condemned for allegedly targeting a NATO member.
At this stage, Turkey does not appear ready to plunge headlong into the war. This is, of course, a positive development. However, given that this “cautiousness” is neither principled nor the result of a consistent foreign policy, there is little reason for the working people of Turkey, Iran, or the wider region to feel reassured. Turkey is navigating an extremely chaotic landscape shaped by both internal and external dynamics—a heavily mined terrain. The potential consequences illustrate why it is necessary to part ways as soon as possible, and why the fate of Turkey and its working people must be separated from that of Turkish capital.
Let us briefly recall the recent past.
The Iran War began as part of a broader process at a time when what might be called “pax Americana” in the Middle East was gaining momentum and securing ground.
In the months leading up to this development, the global order shaped after the collapse of the Soviet Union—particularly the principle of the inviolability of borders—had already been shaken by the Ukraine war. Meanwhile, attacks in Palestine continued in full view of the world; the most uncompromising elements of the resistance, led by Hamas, were eliminated; the resistance was weakened; and the groundwork was laid for transforming Palestine and Gaza into a dystopian hub of capital, increasingly detached from poor Palestinians under the guise of a “peace framework.”
Even before reaching this point, in Syria, the U.S., the UK, and Israel—alongside Turkey—supported the rise of jihadist forces to power in order to remove an already weakened government that was seen as an obstacle to Israel’s security and to enable deeper intervention in Syria’s internal affairs. In doing so, even the interests of Kurdish nationalist movements and autonomous regions—long aligned with U.S. imperialism—were disregarded. What Turkey may have conceded in return, particularly regarding the weakening of Kurdish autonomy in Syria (which it strongly opposes), is a subject in itself. Today, Syria is governed not only by forces acting as proxies of imperialism but also by actors whose legitimacy remains deeply contested, thereby justifying further intervention. At the same time, significant efforts were made to weaken resistance in Lebanon. In addition to direct Israeli attacks, attempts were made to cut off support channels to Hezbollah and isolate it.
After all this, it was widely expected that Iran would be next. But why would this concern Turkey?
Within Turkey’s ruling circles and capitalist class, there is an ongoing debate between more “cautious” and more assertive factions. This debate revolves entirely around interests, profits, and access to new markets. Naturally, it also has implications for how Turkey’s security architecture should be shaped, as these actors seek to protect the positions they have gained. At present, both sides converge on the necessity of acting in full alignment with U.S. imperialism. Even those who argue for a less aggressive foreign policy ultimately agree on the need for deeper integration into the U.S. orbit.
While this situation may indeed give rise to debate, the answer to whether anything beneficial for working people of Turkey can emerge from it is clear: absolutely nothing.
It is not difficult to understand the reasons behind Turkey’s support for steps that would weaken Iran. Iran is one of the strongest regional competitors Turkey faces. They compete over regional influence—from the Middle East to the Caucasus—and over shaping the positions of Islamist-based organizations such as Hamas. Some interpret the potential elimination of Iran as an opportunity for Turkey to dominate the region. However, this is an illusion.
There are concrete reasons for this. It is unlikely that the U.S. would grant Turkey full regional leadership, especially to a country that has occasionally pursued policies in conflict with U.S. interests in the past. Given that the U.S. often prefers to manage its allies through competition—as seen in the Greece–Turkey and Israel–Turkey dynamics—the guiding logic has long been: “who better represents U.S. interests.” At the same time, the Turkish bourgeoisie must be taken into account—an ambitious force with imperial aspirations, seeking expansion and possessing one of the most advanced militaries, industrial capacities, and arms industries in the region. This makes it a country that the U.S. would not want to fully empower.
For this reason, some argue that factions within Turkey advocating deeper involvement in Iran—similar to Syria—are falling into a trap. They believe that after Iran, Turkey itself could become the next target.
While anti-Iran narratives are continuously reinforced ideologically within Turkey—portraying Iran as weak—when U.S. rhetoric escalates toward regime change and occupation, it is not surprising that the government tends to adopt a more restrained tone. This shift reflects concerns that imperialist conflicts could eventually turn against Turkish capital itself. Thus, the limits of the government’s opposition to the escalation of the Iran War are defined entirely by the interests of Turkish capital, not the people.
There is a certain truth to this perspective. In a time when borders and governments across the region are increasingly blurred, some leading actors within the imperialist system clearly have no interest in seeing Turkey survive as a national entity inherited from the revolutionary era of the early 20th century. The Turkish bourgeoisie is complicit in this, pursuing its own expansionist agenda. It is worth remembering that the faltering peace process in Turkey has often been framed—by both the government and the Kurdish nationalist movement—as a Turkish-Kurdish-Arab alliance aiming to resurrect the Ottoman legacy in the region. Yet if the expansion of a country’s borders can be debated, so too can its contraction. To question Turkey as a political entity is to risk the total fragmentation of the Turkish working class.
For the working people of Turkey, the challenge is clear: either they find a way to change this system before things come to a head—or, if an existential crisis does arise, to turn that moment into an opportunity to resist both foreign interference and the so-called “national” actors who uphold this system.
* Cansu Oba is a member of the TKP Central Committee
