The war triggered by Israel’s attacks on Iran and intensified by Iran’s retaliation lasted for 12 days. Although short-lived, this war marked a significant turning point in world politics. It is essential to analyze this conflict from various angles, including what it means for the relationship between Turkey and Iran.
Turkey and Iran are two of the most powerful countries in the Middle East. A look at history reveals that the relationship between these two countries has experienced many ups and downs.
The AKP government in Turkey has, for quite some time, preferred to maintain a balanced relationship with the countries in the region — including Iran. A similar approach, at least on the surface, was displayed during the recent war as well. In fact, toward the end of the conflict, on June 21, Iranian government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani made a statement expressing appreciation for the clear and determined stance of four countries. The countries she named were Russia, China, Pakistan, and Turkey. However, the situation is far from that simple.
The AKP government had played a significant role in the regime changes in Iraq and Libya. In the subsequent civil war in Libya, it openly supported one of the warring factions and helped prevent that side’s defeat. Later, Turkey also developed relations with the opposing side, and to this day, its influence over the country remains.
More recently, the AKP government played a major role in efforts to remove the Ba’ath regime from power in Syria. For years, Turkey openly supported many of the Islamist groups fightingagainst the Assad government.
All of these initiatives were products of a foreign policy approach commonly referred to as Neo-Ottomanism. Claiming to inherit the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, the AKP government developed a reflex of ownership over all the lands once ruled by the Ottomans, referring to them as the “Ottoman legacy.” This Neo-Ottoman policy, of course, did not stem merely from a nostalgic longing for the pre-Republican past or for previous centuries — it was driven by very contemporary needs. Turkey’s advanced capitalist economy was seeking to expand beyond its borders and create new spheres of influence. Turkey aspired to climb higher within the imperialist hierarchy, and this policy aligned closely with that ambition.
It was clear that a regime change in Syria would have far-reaching consequences. So far, the greatest blow has been dealt to the Palestinian resistance, as Assad’s Syria had served as a vital gateway for that struggle. After Syria, it was evident that Iran would be next. The Neo-Ottoman policy played a significant role in reaching this point.
Neo-Ottomanism seeks to use imperialism’s attempts to reshape the Middle East, seeing them as major opportunities. In this new Middle East — where borders, balances, and alliances are beginning to shift — Turkey aims to carve out new spheres of influence for itself.
Israel’s recent attacks on Iran sparked a sense of excitement within the AKP and among pro-government capitalist circles. While this excitement was never openly reflected in official policy, it could easily be sensed in the writings and statements of those close to the government. These circles referred to Iran as the historical enemy of the Ottoman Empire. Islamist segments of these circles often trace this hostility to the sectarian divide, framing it around the dominance of Sunni Islam in Turkey versus Shia Islam in Iran, and grounding the enmity in events from the 16th century in particular. At that time, the struggle for dominance over Anatolian lands was waged between the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid Empire — a struggle that ended in favor of the Ottomans. The Safavid Empire is considered the precursor to modern Iran, and the establishment of Shiism as Iran’s official sect dates back to the Safavid period.
Another approach, not directly targeting Iran, took shape around the idea of maintaining equal distance from both warring sides — viewing both countries as Turkey’s key regional rivals. According to this perspective, the real target would eventually be Turkey itself. For example, a prominent Islamist journalist close to the government described the Iran-Israel war as a “staged fight,” claiming that the primary goal was to divert attention away from Gaza. He argued that the ongoing tension between the Iranian government and its people had been resolved in favor of the regime, and that Iran had been turned into both a victim and a hero.
On the other hand, even though they were not close to the government, some pro-Western — and even pro-Israel — circles and journalists adopted an anti-Iran stance based on secularist ground. They argued that the collapse of Iran’s religious and reactionary regime would also be beneficial for Turkey.
However, the shift in atmosphere following Iran’s retaliation against Israeli attacks also influenced the aforementioned circles, leading to a noticeable retreat of those earlier narratives.
The government, for its part, adopted a balanced official stance. For example, while it condemned the U.S. airstrikes on Iran, it also criticized Iran’s retaliatory bombing of the U.S. base in Qatar. Meanwhile, close contact with the Iranian leadership continued. Yet there is a significant contradiction between this balanced rhetoric and Turkey’s ongoing cooperation with main imperialist powers. The military bases in Turkey that are open to use by the U.S. and NATO played an active role in Israel and the U.S.’s operations against Iran. Most notably, the Kürecik Radar Base in Malatya contributed to detecting missiles launched from Iran. These facts reveal where the AKP government truly stands. In recent times, the government has steered its long-standing Neo-Ottoman foreign policy increasingly toward alignment with Western imperialism. In reality, it never weakened its ties with Western imperialist actors. However, in its search for new zones of manoeuvring to accommodate Turkish capitalism’s need for expansion, it occasionally experienced tensions with these actors. Within this context, closer relations were developed with countries like Russia and Iran — states targeted by Western imperialism. On the other hand, these relationships have also enabled Turkey to play the role of a transmission belt between Western powers and these countries. The most recent example of this occurred at the Economic Cooperation Organization summit held in Azerbaijan. The image of Pezeshkian, Erdoğan, and Aliyev standing together was widely shared by Turkey’s official media outlets, described as “sincere moments that spread rapidly on social media.”
Another dimension of the issue concerns the Azeri population living in Iran, which, according to various estimates, constitutes between 15% and 25% of the country’s total population. The potential success of imperialist attacks and the possibility of Iran’s disintegration as a result have stirred unrest among the Azeri population. Azerbaijan’s rapidly deepening cooperation with Western imperialism in recent years has bolstered its ambitions of becoming a regional power. The growing tension in Azerbaijan-Russia relations should also be evaluated within this context. The close relationship between Turkey and Azerbaijan has fueled the idea that Turkey could benefit from Azerbaijan’s expanding influence into Iranian territory. Recent steps taken to include Armenia in this cooperation should also be understood in this same framework.
Another key dynamic involves the Kurds living in Iran and other countries in the region. In the early days of the Israeli attacks, some separatist Kurdish actors in Iran issued statements claiming that the assault presented an opportunity to topple the regime — and that this opportunity should be seized. However, these declarations were not followed by any concrete actions.
The AKP government would prefer such transformations to occur gradually, in a way that allows it to expand its own sphere of influence, rather than through rapid and uncontrollable change. The Neo-Ottoman foreign policy framework positions Iran as an adversary, both due to its status as a regional power and because of its alignment with a different sectarian bloc. From this perspective, Iran’s weakening is seen as favorable. However, a full regime change — which would likely lead to the country’s rapid disintegration and create power vacuums inviting intervention from imperialist forces and Israel — is not currently desirable. Such a scenario would trigger the emergence of uncontrollable Azeri and Kurdish dynamics, each posing significant challenges in terms of management and containment.
Turkish capitalism, which seeks growth and expansion, is driving a Neo-Ottoman foreign policy marked by opportunism and inconsistency. This policy, which shifts shape depending on circumstances, offers no meaningful hope for the peoples of the region whose futures are threatened by imperialist interventions.
* Murat Akad is a member of TKP Party Council
