What is unfolding around Iran is not an isolated war, nor simply another episode of instability in the Middle East. It is part of the ongoing US–Israeli imperialist aggression in the region, which itself unfolds within a broader confrontation between rival imperialist centers.
Within this confrontation, China is not a distant observer or a neutral force. It is a rising capitalist power, deeply involved in the struggle for energy, routes and influence. And increasingly, it is a major strategic rival of the United States.
The position of China in the region is not defined by statements or diplomatic phrasing. It rests on hard material interests. Iran sends the overwhelming majority of its oil exports, around 90%, to China. That is not a detail. It is a structural link. It operates under conditions shaped by sanctions, discounted prices and a whole network of mechanisms designed to bypass Western controls.
This relationship has also been formalized through a long-term strategic agreement. It opens the door to massive Chinese investments in infrastructure, energy and technology. At the same time, Beijing expands its economic ties with the Gulf monarchies, many of them long-standing allies of Washington. There is no contradiction here. This is how a rising power moves. Carefully, but consistently. It builds presence on all sides without rushing into open confrontation before it has to.
Seen from this angle, China’s role looks very different from the usual clichés about “balance” or “mediation”. It is not trying to calm the region out of principle. It is securing ground. The Middle East is not some distant theater for Beijing. It is tied directly to energy security, trade routes — above all through the Belt and Road Initiative— and long-term planning. In other words, to the material basis of its growth.
The idea that China stands outside imperialist competition, or worse, that it represents some kind of “anti-imperialist pole”, does not survive serious examination. On the contrary, it reflects a profoundly anti-Leninist reading of contemporary developments, shaped by the persistent illusions of ‘multipolarity’.”
Contemporary China functions as a capitalist great power. It has powerful monopolistic groups. It exports capital on a massive scale. It competes relentlessly for markets, resources and strategic corridors. Its policy toward Iran does not point to an alternative path. It reflects a different position within the same system. One that seeks influence, builds dependencies and extends its own reach.
This becomes clearer when one looks at its broader initiatives. The network of Eurasian corridors is often presented in neutral or even cooperative terms. In reality, it reorganizes space. It redirects flows of trade. It locks regions into long-term relations of dependence. Iran’s place within these networks is not accidental, and it is not ideological. It is strategic.
And this is where things begin to tighten. In the Middle East today, two large-scale projects are unfolding at the same time.
On one side stands the Euro-Atlantic bloc, led by the United States, a bloc marked by intensifying internal contradictions, including those between the US, the EU and NATO. It seeks to reshape routes and alliances in order to preserve its dominant position. On the other side, an expanding Eurasian framework with China at its core pushes forward alternative corridors and connections.
These are not parallel developments that simply coexist. They collide and reshape the terrain. Not always openly, not always at the same intensity, but the direction is clear. Both sides are trying to secure space, lock in advantages and limit the room for the other, while contradictions also run within each camp.
Within this setting, China’s involvement in the conflict around Iran does not need to take the form of direct military engagement to be real. Its role is already embedded in the structure of the situation. In the energy flows it depends on. In the infrastructure it builds. In the agreements it signs.
There are also less visible dimensions. Technological transfers. Dual-use materials. Indirect forms of cooperation. Not all of this is fully transparent, and not all of it needs to be. The pattern is clear enough. This is not neutrality. It is participation, just not always in the most obvious form.
At the same time, the war feeds back into the broader competition. The prolonged engagement of the United States in the Middle East consumes resources, shifts priorities and stretches military capacities. Advanced weapons are used up faster than they can be replaced. Strategic assets are moved from other regions. Defense systems are redeployed under pressure.
These are not just technical details. They matter. They change balances, even if gradually. China is watching closely and drawing its own conclusions. The use of artificial intelligence in targeting. The exposure of vulnerabilities in high-cost defense systems. The way relatively cheap drones force disproportionate responses. All of this becomes part of a wider accumulation of experience.
Still, the relationship between these powers is not a simple zero-sum game. There is also a layer of deep interdependence. China’s structural position in global supply chains, especially in areas like rare earths and key industrial components, means that even the military operations of its rivals reinforce their dependence on Chinese production.
That is one of the contradictions of the current phase. Competition intensifies. Dependence deepens. It does not cancel the conflict. It makes it more unstable.
Put all this together and a broader picture emerges. The conflict around Iran is not an isolated flashpoint. It connects with other tensions and other fronts, economic, technological, military, that are slowly converging.
The antagonism between the Euro-Atlantic bloc and the emerging Eurasian alignment is becoming more visible, more direct. Not fully open yet. Not everywhere. But it is there. And it is hard to see how it simply fades away.
China, in this context, is not outside the system. It is one of its central actors. Its rise does not soften global competition. It pushes it further. And that matters, because this kind of competition has a direction. It tends to escalate.
So the real question is not whether China is involved in the imperialist war in Iran. It already is, in ways that are both direct and indirect, visible and less visible. The question is where this dynamic leads.
Because once these contradictions deepen to a certain point, they do not remain contained. They begin to connect. To reinforce each other. And eventually, to break out of the limits that once held them in place.
This must be stated clearly and repeated as long as necessary:
For the peoples, the choice is not between competing imperialist centers. The confrontation between them does not serve their interests. Neither camp offers a progressive alternative. The only real perspective lies in the independent struggle against all imperialist alliances and against the capitalist system that generates war, exploitation and instability.
* Nikos Mottas is the Editor-in-Chief of In Defense of Communism.